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AIN export controls have been suggested as a
means of reducing the unfavorable impact on domes-
tic consumers of the relatively small feed grain crop
this year. The nation’s feed grain crop has been esti-
mated at 175 million tons, or 15 percent less tlman a
year ago, as a restmlt of extremely dry weather.’ Pro-
duction this year plus an estimated carryover of 22
mmmilhon tons totals 198 million tomss available fordomes-
tic use plus exports. This is 16 percent less than the
total last year. The quantity of wheat and other con-
centrates available for feed plus exports is no greater
than last year, thus there are no offsetting gains from
these feed sources.
Exports of feed grains have risen sham-ply in recent
years and accounted for 43.7 million tomms or 20 percent
of total usage last year. Such exports were up 50 per-
cent from the 1972 level and 150 percent from 1971.
As a consequence of the sharp decline in the quan-
tity of feed grain available and the prospects for large
exports again this year, proposals have been made to
establish export quotas.2 Such quotas womsld limit ex-
ports to levels below those determined by market
forces and increase the quantity of graism available to
feed domestic animals. Omme writer argued that time
estahlishnmesmt of export quotas “offers the only way ism
which the presemmt food amsd feed situation can be
fairly dealt witlm. It amommmmts to proteetiomm, 0mm a rea-
sonable basis, of the interests of the Ummited States;
tinmely warning to foreigmm clainmants; and the estab-
lislmmesmt of fair and equitable access for timenm to a
generous share of total U.S. supplies.”5
tmShort tons (2,000 pounds) of com, sorgmim grain, barley, and
oats.
2
For example, see “Governnment Weighs Craiss Export Curbs
The Wall Street Journal, 14 August 1974; “Midwest
Drought: Economic Tinme Bomb,” U.S. News and World
Report, 26 August 1974; “World Trade,” New York Journal
of Commerce, 22 Augnst 1974; and “Butz Sees the Light,”
The Commercial Appeal, 24 August 1974.
~b-Hans Richter-Allschaffer, “Farm Exports: Toward Timnely
Controls,” New York Times, 4 September 1974, p. 3$M.
THE SHORT-RUN VIEW
Craism export controls, as implied in the proposed
quotas, could serve time mmatiomm with tolerable satisfac-
tion in time slsort run. Suclm actions are simple and
direct, ammd timus tend to appeal to masmy people. Direct
export controls would have asm early impact on the
nlomestie food stmpply. Time nation possesses a given
asmmoummt of grain, and the less tlsat is exported, the
greater would be tIme asnount available for domnestic
use. An increase in tIme quantity available for domestic
use would tend to lower domestic grain prices, in-
crease livestock feeding, and increase output of beef,
pork, pommitry, milk, asmcl eggs, thus redueimmg food costs.
Early results are asstmred in termns of snmalier imscreases
imm food costs to niommmestie eomssnsmmmers tlmans would Imave
otherwise occurred, and tlmis is the overriding factor
to the proponents of export quotas.
Quotas Might Reduce Returns to Producers
and Domestic Consumers
The early gains to consunmers in terms of lower food
prices is not the whole story, however, even in the
short run. A decrease in feed grain exports resulting
from time imposition of quotas nmight have an un-
favoralmie immmpact on time ismcosnes of graism producers
asmd ons time pri.ees of immmports. Givemm a relatively fixed
quantity of graio foilowissg Imarvests, chammges in the
market price usstii time next harvest year largely reflect
changes in desnassd commditiosms ism tIme Ummitecl States
ammd abroad. If exports were limited by n1mmotas tlme
effective demasmd for U. S. grain would he less, and
domestic prices would he lower. If the effects of
lower dosnestic prices were smot offset by higimer re-




Craimm producer incomes could rise in the slmort rmmmm provided
amm expnsrt qnmota system is applied to each pronlmmcer ammd for—
eigmm de,msaonl for U.S - grain is inelastic — that is, lnmw cost feeni
grain substitutes are not available.
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At tIme sammme tinme, the immmpositicsmm of qunmtmms comslnl
reduce the vnmiusne of ismmports avnmilanle tnm nlosmmestic
commssmmrmers._A reducti.osm ins time ammmnsummt of graism avail.—
able imm xvorlnl markets womsks raise wnmrld grains prices.
Depesmding uposs tIme availaimility nmf substitutes, total
expesmditures 0mm U. S. grains by fnmreigmm lmuyers miglmt
either immcrease or nlecrease.
If relatively low-cost substitutes are available, tlmcnm
the umcrease ism graims prices would1 he relatively somali
anmd womsid nmot nmffset time decrease mm tIme qtsammtity-
snmld; total expenmditmnres lmy foreigms buyers of U. S.
graiss would decline. Asmy such reduction ins total ex-
penditures by foreign purelmasers of U. S. graism would
result in a decline in the denmammd for dollars ammd a
decrease ism tIme internatiossal value of tlme dollar. This
would imply’ timat tlme donmmestic price of our inmmports
wotmld rise. Commsequemmtly-, the impositiomm of n1smotas
would increase prices to U. S. cosssunmers of inmported
commodities ansd those comnmodities wlmiclm imse im-
ports as issputs to productiomm. Time gaism to U. S. cons-
sunmen~ism terms of reduced food prices coulnl thesm
very well be offset by an increase in the prices of other
commmnmodities. 1mm this case tlmere is a loss sustaismed by
U. S. consumers and grain producers and a gain by
producers of other exports.
If low-cost substitutes are not available, lmowever,
total expenditures by foreigmm grain purchasers would
men-ease. An immerease in total foreign expenditures in
time Ummited States would lead to a rise in the exchange
rate asmd thus’ ‘a lowerismg of the dosmmestie price of im-
ports and a rise in the foreign price of U. S. exports.
If substitutes are available for our other exports, then
U. S. exporters of these goods would incur losses. As
a result, donmestie grain producers and domestic grains
consumers gaimm at time expesmse of other U. S. exporters
and fnmreigmm cosmsunmers.
i’Immss, eosmsumers ins time Ummited States womsld stasmd
to gain mm the short runm frommm tIme cosmtrols omsly if de-
mand for grain in the world market were inelastic —
that is, if few grains substitutes were available anmd time
reduced quasmtity of graism were sold to foreignm pur-
chasers for nmore dollars.
Another consideration in the imposition of quotas
is that they might induce retaliation. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that oil-producing nations decided to retaliate
by imposing quotas on timeir oil exports to the United
States. This would raise the domestic price of oil, and
again, U. S. consumers could be worse off than before.
The above analysis indicates that in the sisort run
the net effect of the quotas could be a decrease in
the quasmtitv of innports anmd asm ismcrease mm the quasm-
tity of grain available to consumers in the United
States. One should he reminded, however, that if feed
grains were more valuable to domestic consumers than
the imports, the market itself would guarantee timat no
grains would he exported. In other words, if domestic
consunmers were willing to pay more for graism tlmasm for
products from abroad, grain producers would be able
to sell their grain for lmighcr returns ins the United
States than in the won-id market. In this context, in-
stead of purportedly increasing consumer well-being,
tIme imposition of export quotas, evesm for a period of
one year, would actually decrease well-being.
THE LONG-RUN IMPACT
In contrast to the possibility of some slmort-run gains
to domestic consumers from grain export quotas, over
the longer run such quotas would he harmful to both
domestic and foreign consumers. Given time for retali-
atory policies and resource adjustments, export quotas
on grain wommld, in time long run, tend to: (1) reduce
grain exports; (2) reduce domestic grain production;
(3) decrease dosnestic farnm inconmes; (4) reduce the
overall qmnasmtity of goods and services produced,
therehy lowerismg the well-being of commsumers in the
United States asmd time rest of the world; and (5) cause
further increases ins domestic prices.
Reduces Grain Er-ports
In addition to their immediate isnpacts, export quo-
tas wlsich limit time quantity of grain exported in the
ctmrremmt year xvould tesmni to reduce the valmne of
future grain exports. For example, if the United States
permits grain importing nations free access to nmnr grain
markets only during years when production is equal
to or above the trend level, this nation would cease to
be a dependable source of grain supplies. Conse-
querntly, those nations wlmiclshave heretofore depended
on the United States for a portion of their grain would
likely take action to assure a relatively stable supply,
rather than depend on U. S. imports on an intermit-
tent basis. Food consunmption habits develop over a
period of years and do not change readily for the
convenience of such on and off trade.
Grain importimsg nations could provide for alterna-
tive sources of grainssupplies in several different ways.
They d’ould ismcnease their owmm produetiomm imm the loimg
run because of the increase in the cost and unreli-
ability of U. S. grain. They might also negotiate
bilateral trade agreements with other grain producing
nations for a greater portion of their grain supply.
Such agreements might be accompanied by protective
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tariffs and import restrictions applied during the years
that this nation had larger than average supplies, or
had surpluses if price supports were used to prevent
price declines. Either of tine above moutes to a more
dependable source would ultimately result in less U. S.
grain exports and a con-esponding reduction in im-
ports of foreign goods and services.
Reduces U.S. Grain Production
If the quotas were at all effective, they would re-
sult in lower domestic grain prices and, therefore, in
decreased production. Since farmers operate under
competitive conditions, they produce at the level
where the estimated cost of producing the last unit of
outpnt is equal to the projected price. Production of
additional units entails higlser per unit costs of pro-
ductions, ansd a decrease in price caused by export
quotas implies tlsat some of the output is being pro-
duced at a loss unless the producer anticipated the
lower pnces at the time of planting. Consequently,
each farmer would reduce production and total grain
output would decline.
From the donsestie consumers’ point of view, such a
decline in production is not objectionable. He would
get a somewhat larger quantity of grain at a mar-
ginally lower price tisan otlserxvise. Hence, time direct
burden of reduced. U. S. grain outpnst would be borne
by foreign consumers svho receive less grain at higher
prices and domestic grain producers who would incur
capital losses as resous-ces were transferred from the
production of grains to time production of other prod-
ucts. But, as will be seen later, there are secondary
effects which would work towards reducing the well-
being of U. S. consumers.
Another factor wisicln tends to reduce production
under a quota regime is time greater price risks taken
by producers. Under export controls time price signals
received by producers reflect not only world supply
and demand consditions hut also the uncertainty witln
respect to time restrictiosms. Tine political forces which
determined the controls would he tine result of conn-
promises hetween feed grain producers, feed users,
and consumer groups. The result of such compromises
and their impact on prices is difficult to predict.
Hence, producers and farm credit suppliers would
have to snake allowance for these additional risks in
their production and lending plans.
Reduces Farm Incomes
Famsn incomes wouinl he less under export quotas
tlsans with free tranle. The lower prices per usmit re-
eeivcnl for grains conmslmissn’nl with ns reductions ins graism
onttptmt would ~mrolmaImly resnnlt ins a sizable nieclinme ins
gross sales. Consequesmtin-, inmcnmnmes to grains prodtmcers
assd retursms tnm timeir resonnrces would decline.
Reduces Well-Being for U.S. and
World Consumers
In the discussion of the short-run effects of the im-
positions of grain export quotas, time possibility of a
declisse in time well-being of U.S. consumers was dis-
cussed. Time possibility exists because of a potential
increase ins tine prices nsf imports. In time long run,
insteanl of just time possibility of a loss, tine loss be-
comes a certainty. If quoto.s were effective, grain pro-
ductions and grains exports mvoulnl decline, Ins the short
run, domestic consumer gains or losses would depend
0mm wlsetlser foreignmers could finmd substitutes for our
grain. In tIne lossg run, ssmbstitutes are always available
and tine quotas would restsit inn trade losses.
Tine losses occur because in time long run our for-
eign currency earnings wos.nld decline and we would
he able to bmny less foreign products, sucln as oil, sugar,
coffee, and raw nnaterials for the nsansmfaeture of steel
and alumismmnm. Again, osse could make an argument
that a decline in the domestic price of grain would
offset the increase in the price of oil amsd other im-
ported products, and tlmat domestic consunners would
ime as well off witss tlse expnsrt qnnotas as prior to tlmeir
insmposition. This reasoning, Imonvever, connpietely over-
looks time source of the foreigss trade gains. WIny, for
example, was the United States producing wheat in
tine first place and exclnammging it for oil rather than
producing all of the oil that the nation consumed? The
simple answer is that by producing wheat and trading
it for oil we gained wealth. That is, the process used
up less of our resources than if we had taken resources
used in the productinmn of wheat and used them to
increase the production of oil. Through trade we
have obtained more oil and more wheat tinan we could
acquire by attempting to become self sufficient in the
production of botim wheat and oil.
This is time fundamenstal reasons for all specialization
asmnl for all trade, donsmestic ansd inmternmationnal. lmndivid—
uals, as well as countries, have different natural and
technnologieal enndomvumemmts, nmnmd Imy specializinmg inn tine
production of some goods and services and exchanging
tlnens fnmr otlmers, they cams inmcreasc tine tnmtal amssonnnmt of
all products that are available for consumption.
Despite the artificial quadruphng of oil prices by
time oil producers’ cartel, it may still be cheaper to cx-
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change grain for oil than to produce additional quan-
tities of oil domestically. An imposition of quotas
would shift our resources frons the production of grain
to the production of oil and we would tlmus forego the
savings accrued from exchange. Tine opposite shift
wotnld take place in foreign counmtries. As a result, all
eosssumers, botin donmsestic ammd foreignm, would be worse
off.
Thus, what appears to nsany people as a reduction
in food prices and an increase in the welfare of U. S.
consumers from time establishment of grain export
quotas, actually becomes a net loss. This country has
opposed the imposition of artificial restrictions on oil
output by the oil-producing countries, It is argued
that such restrictions could cause a worldwide decline
in the standard of living. Yet, some analysts are pro-
posing that the United States practice the same tac-
tics and the same consequences would likely be in
prospect.
Increases Domestic Prices
Grain export controls over the long run would tend
to cause tine domestic price level to be higher than
would have prevailed without the controls. To the ex-
tent that the controls reduced international speciaJi-
zation of production and exchange of goods, they
would reduce the total quantity of goods available to
consumers in both the United States and foreign coumn-
tries. This reduction in supply, assuming no offsetting
change in the rate of monetary growth, would cause
higher prices. Thus, instead of contributing to a lower
rate of inflation, as contended by some of the pro-
ponents, export controls would actually cause further
price increases.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The quantity of feed grain available for domestic
use plus exports is dosvns this year from the level of a
year ago. The decline will tend to reduce livestock
feeding and cause higher food prices.
Proposals have been made to limit feed grain ex-
ports througln export quotas to avoid the upward
pressure on food prices from the reduced grain sup-
plies. This proposed solution is simple and direct, and
may appeal to many people. However, such quotas
could actually reduce the economic well-being of the
nations iss time slnort run and would certainly renluee
well-being over a longer period.
In the short run domestic food prices would be
lower witlm the quotas tlsanm witlnotnt thenss. I-lowever,
depemnclmg oss whetlser or snot tlsere are substitutes for
U. S. grains in foreignm nmarkets, the prices of U. S. im-
ports could rise sigmnifieantly. As a result, U. S. con-
sumers could enmd up with more grain and fewer
inmports thasm they would lnave in a free exchanmge sys-
tesu. In smmclm a situatiosn, both timis snatiosm anmd grain
importinng nnationms would lose as a result of the quotas.
Ins additions, the qtnotas snight trigger sonmse han-ssmful
retaliatory measures by fnmreigns nsatiosms, such as tine
aetiosms of tine oil cartel last year.
Over the longer run, export quotas would be even
more damaging than in the slnort run. In the long run
tlmey inmlnihit donmestie grains production annl reduce
donssestic farnms ineonsnes. Bsnt of greater insportasmce,
tlmev reduce the long-rums gainms fronn inmternmationsal
specializations, tlmerehy greatly redueisng the overall
nmutpnnt of goods anmd services, the ss’ell-heinng of cons-
summmers, anmd cansse ftnrther price inmcreases mm hotls tlsis
nation and abroad.
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